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Abstract 
We analyse the impact of fiscal shocks on the Spanish effective exchange rate over the 
period 1981-2008 using a standard structural VAR framework. We show that government 
spending brings about positive output responses, jointly with real appreciation. Such real 
appreciation is explained by persistent nominal appreciation and higher relative prices. 
Our results indicate that the adoption of the common currency has not implied any 
significant change in the way fiscal shocks affect external competitiveness through their 
effect on relative prices. In turn, the current account deteriorates when government 
spending rises mainly due to the fall of exports caused by the real appreciation. 
Accordingly, our results in this regard are largely consistent not only with the conventional 
Mundell-Fleming model and, in general a traditional Keynesian view, but also with a wide set 
of RBC or New Keynesian models under standard calibrations. Moreover, our estimations 
are fully in line with the “twin deficits” hypothesis. Furthermore, we show that shocks to 
purchases of goods and services and public investment lead to real appreciation, whereas 
the opposite happens with higher personnel expenditure. We obtain output multipliers 
around 0.5 on impact and slightly above unity one year after the shock, which are in line with 
previous empirical evidence regarding some individual European countries. 
JEL Classification: E62, H30. 
Keywords: SVAR, Fiscal shocks, Effective exchange rates, Twin deficits, Fiscal multipliers. 
 
Resumen 
En este trabajo analizamos los efectos de perturbaciones fiscales sobre el tipo de cambio 
efectivo de España durante el período 1981-2008 mediante un marco estándar de modelos 
VAR estructurales. Aquí se muestra que el gasto público conlleva respuestas positivas de 
la producción, conjuntamente con una apreciación real. Esta apreciación real se explica 
tanto por una persistente apreciación del tipo de cambio efectivo nominal, como por el 
aumento de los precios relativos. Nuestros resultados indican que la adopción de la moneda 
común no parece haber implicado cambios significativos respecto a la manera en que las 
perturbaciones fiscales afectan a la competitividad exterior a través de su efecto sobre 
los precios relativos. Por su parte, el saldo por cuenta corriente se deteriora en respuesta 
a incrementos de gasto público principalmente como consecuencia de la caída de las 
exportaciones provocada por la apreciación real. Por lo tanto, nuestros resultados son 
en gran medida compatibles no solo con el modelo Mundell-Fleming convencional 
y, en general, con una visión Keynesiana tradicional, sino también con un amplio abanico de 
modelos de ciclo real o de corte neo-Keynesiano con calibraciones estándar. Asimismo, 
nuestras estimaciones están plenamente en consonancia con la hipótesis de «déficits 
gemelos». Por otra parte, mostramos que aumentos en las compras de bienes y servicios y 
en inversión pública conllevan apreciaciones reales, mientras que lo contrario sucede ante 
aumentos de los gastos de personal de las AAPP. Finalmente, se obtienen multiplicadores 
del gasto público alrededor de 0,5 en impacto y ligeramente por encima de la unidad 
transcurrido un año después del aumento del gasto. Estos valores están en consonancia 
con la evidencia empírica disponible para algunos países europeos.  
Códigos JEL: E62, H30. 
Palabras clave: SVAR, perturbaciones fiscales, tipos de cambio efectivos, déficits gemelos, 
multiplicadores fiscales. 
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1 0BIntroduction 
Last years have witnessed an increasing literature on the macroeconomic effects of 
discretionary fiscal policy in a wide set of countries. This strand of the literature gained 
momentum with Blanchard and Perotti (2002), who proposed a new and interesting 
methodology to identify fiscal policy shocks in VARs with quarterly data by exploiting decision 
lags in policy making and information about elasticities of fiscal variables to economic 
activity. 0F1 Notwithstanding, other studies such as Mountford and Uhlig (2009) assess the 
effects of fiscal shocks under a different methodology that consists in imposing some sign 
restrictions to impulse response functions. While most papers have focused on the U.S. 
[Edelberg et al. (1999); Fatás and Mihov (2001); Blanchard and Perotti (2002); Perotti (2004), 
and Mountford and Uhlig (2009), among others], growing evidence on other countries 
has arisen. Some examples in this regard are Heppke-Falk et al. (2006) for Germany, 
De Castro (2006) and De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) for Spain, Giordano 
et al. (2007) for Italy, Marcellino (2006) for the four largest countries of the euro area or 
Afonso and Sousa (2009a and 2009b) for Germany, Italy and Portugal, Bénassy-Quéré 
and Cimadomo (2006) for Germany, the U.K. and the U.S., or Burriel et al. (2010) for the 
whole euro area, among others. 
However, most of these papers fail to analyse in depth the implications of 
fiscal shocks on external competitiveness, a crucial element especially for small open 
economies such as Spain. Still, there are some recent studies assessing the effects of fiscal, 
mainly spending, shocks on the nominal or real exchange rate, relative prices or the terms of 
trade. Nevertheless, as it is commonplace in the analysis of discretionary fiscal shocks, broad 
agreement on their effects is lacking. Thus, Kim and Roubini (2008) and Enders et al. (2011) 
for the U.S., Monacelli and Perotti (2010) for Australia, the U.S. and the U.K. and Ravn 
et al. (2007) for a pool of Australia, Canada, the U.S. and the U.K., find that higher 
government expenditure yields real depreciations. By contrast, Beetsma et al. (2008) for 
a panel of EU counties, Corsetti et al. (2009) for the U.S. or Bénétrix and Lane (2009a) 
or Galstyan and Lane (2009a) for Ireland argue that government spending shocks lead to 
real appreciations. Moreover, Bénétrix and Lane (2009b) get the same result with a panel 
with the euro area countries. In addition, Froot and Rogoff (1991), De Gregorio et al. (1994) 
and Galstyan and Lane (2009b) observe long-run real appreciation in response to increases 
in government consumption. 
 In the related literature real depreciation caused by government expenditure shocks 
is justified on the basis of the following argument: in a large economy, a fiscal expansion 
increases the real interest rate, which depresses private consumption. Since the demand for 
money is assumed to depend on private consumption, insofar as prices are sticky, a fall in 
consumption leads to a depreciation of the nominal and real exchange rate [see Obstfeld and 
Rogoff (1995)]. Moreover, it is also argued that in the short run international price movements 
tend to amplify instead of mitigate country-specific consumption risk [Enders et al. (2010)]. 
Conversely, a usual argument behind spending shocks-led real appreciations is 
that insofar as government spending mostly concentrates on home-produced goods, fiscal 
expansions should make these goods relatively scarcer, thereby increasing their relative 
                                                                          
1. Perotti (2004) developed this methodology further and has constituted the basis of later studies focused on different 
countries. 
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price with respect to imported goods and leading to real appreciation [see Frenkel and 
Razin (1996)]. 
 We aim to provide further evidence in this area by assessing the effects of 
government spending shocks on external competitiveness and the current account balance 
in Spain. We base our conclusions on impulse response functions drawn from structural 
VARs, wherein discretionary fiscal shocks have been identified following the methodology 
proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and Perotti (2004). To our understanding, this is 
the first paper that tackles these issues for Spain under this framework. 
We find that government spending shocks lead to real appreciation and deterioration 
of the external balance. Hence, our results are in line with the “twin deficits” hypothesis. 
For the pre EMU period, the real appreciation is explained by both an appreciation of the 
nominal effective exchange rate and by an increase in relative prices; however, within EMU 
such real appreciation stems mainly from the raise of domestic prices. This pattern is 
consistent with not only the conventional Mundell-Fleming model and Keynesian analysis, 
but also with a wide set of RBC models under standard calibrations or with some New 
Keynesian formulations [see, Corsetti et al. (2009)]. 
 By spending component, we show that shocks to purchases of goods and services 
and public investment lead to real appreciation, whereas the opposite happens with higher 
personnel expenditure. Finally, we obtain output multipliers around 0.5 on impact and slightly 
above unity one year after the shock, which are in line with previous empirical evidence 
regarding some individual European countries. However, we offer interesting evidence of 
output multipliers being higher if we constraint our estimations to a period characterised 
by a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 describes the data, section 3 
methodological issues and section 4 the results. Finally, we present our conclusions in 
section 5. 
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2 1BThe data 
The baseline VAR includes quarterly data on public expenditure (gt), net taxes (tt) and GDP 
(yt), all in real terms, 1F2 the GDP deflator (pt), the three-year interest rate of government 
bonds (rt) 2F3 and the real effective exchange rate (REER henceforth) vis à vis the rest of the 
world. All variables are seasonally adjusted and enter in logs except the interest rate, which 
enters in levels.3F4 The definition of fiscal variables follows Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and 
Perotti (2004). In particular, government spending (gt) is defined as the sum of government 
consumption and investment, whereas net taxes (tt) are defined as total government current 
receipts, less current transfers excluding interest payments on government debt. 4F5 In turn, the 
REER is defined vis-à-vis the rest of the World and with consumer prices. As usual, an 
increase reflects a real appreciation. 
We try other VAR specifications aiming to better understand the responses of certain 
variables to fiscal shocks. For this purpose, we also assessed the reactions of nominal 
effective exchange rates, net exports, exports and imports of goods and services or the role 
of relative prices. In those cases, nominal values of net exports, exports and imports were 
all deflated by the GDP deflator in order to avoid neglecting the effect of the different 
prices on the overall external balance. On the other hand, as we are also interested in 
the analysis of exchange rate responses to different types of fiscal shocks, we included 
non-wage government consumption, government spending on wages and salaries and public 
investment in turn as endogenous variables. As before, the GDP deflator was used to get 
their corresponding real values. 
We use data covering the period 1981:Q1 to 2008:Q4. GDP volumes and deflator, 
exports, imports and net exports have been taken from the Quarterly National Accounts 
[National Institute of Statistics (INE)] while the three-year bond rate has been obtained 
from the Banco de España database. The domestic Consumer Price Index has also been 
taken from the INE. In turn, quarterly fiscal variables until 2000 were taken from Estrada 
et al. (2004), which were estimated applying monthly and quarterly official fiscal indicators 
on a cash basis to the official ESA-95 annual account data. These fiscal variables are the 
same as those used in De Castro (2006) and De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008). 
However, from 2000 on, those variables are not interpolated; they are official figures 
published by the IGAE (Ministry of Economy and Finance). Finally, real and nominal effective 
exchange rates vis-à-vis the rest of the World have been obtained from the IFS (IMF) 
database, while the real effective exchange rate with respect to the euro area, also used in 
one simulation, was obtained from the BIS database. Effective exchange rates are defined 
in such a way that an increase reflects an appreciation. 
                                                                          
2. The nominal variables have been deflated by the GDP deflator in order to obtain the corresponding real values. 
3. The long-term interest rate is preferred to the short-term one because of its closer relationship with private 
consumption and investment decisions. However, this choice turned out to be immaterial to the results in that the 
inclusion of short-term rates in the VAR led to similar conclusions. 
4. In order to assess the effects on the exchange rate, an even better and more appropriate option would be to express 
variables relative to the weighted average of trading partners. Unfortunately, we could not follow this approach due to 
the lack of availability of all necessary data for the whole sample period. 
5. More concretely, transfers include all expenditure items except public consumption, public investment and interest 
payments. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 1121 
3 2BSpecification and identification of the baseline (S)VAR model 
The reduced-form baseline VAR is specified in levels and can be written as 
ttt UXLDX += −1)(  (1) 
where Xt ≡ (gt, tt, yt, pt, rt, reert) is the vector of endogenous variables and D(L) is an 
autoregressive lag-polynomial. The benchmark specification includes a constant and a 
deterministic time trend. The vector Ut  ≡ ( reertrtptytttgt uuuuuu ,,,,    , ) contains the reduced-form 
residuals, which in general will present non-zero cross-correlations. The baseline VAR 
includes four lags of each endogenous variable according to the information provided 
by LR tests, the Akaike information criterion and the final prediction error.5F6 
We apply the identification strategy proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
and Perotti (2004), which exploits decision lags in policy making and information 
about the elasticity of fiscal variables to economic activity. Their strategy relies on the 
assumption that the reduced-form residuals of the gt and tt equations, gtu  and 
t
tu , can be 
thought of as linear combinations of three types of shocks: a) the automatic responses 
of spending and net taxes to the rest of macroeconomic variables in the system, 
b) systematic discretionary responses of fiscal policy to the same set of macro variables 
and c) random discretionary fiscal policy shocks, which are  the truly uncorrelated structural 
fiscal policy shocks whose effects are the purpose of our analysis. 
The innovations model can be written as tt VU Β=Γ , where Vt ≡ ( reertrtptytttgt eeeeee ,,,,    , ) 
is the vector containing the orthogonal structural shocks. Accordingly, the reduced-form 
residuals are linear combinations of the orthogonal structural shocks of the form tt VU ΒΓ= −1 . 
The respective matrices Γ and Β can be written as: 
 
 
                                                                          
6. Schwarz and Hannan-Quinn information criteria suggested more parsimonious specifications. In order to assess 
the robustness of our results to different specifications and transformations, we tried several alternatives, including 
estimating with two lags, removing the time trend or substituting the long-term interest rate by a short-term one. These 
different alternatives showed the same qualitative results. 
(2)                                
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As we are interested in analysing the effects of “structural” discretionary fiscal 
shocks gte  and tte  on the rest of the variables of the system, estimations for the αi,j’s and 
βi,j’s in (2) are needed. In general, approving and implementing new measures in response 
to specific economic circumstances typically takes longer than three months. Hence, one 
key assumption in this approach is that quarterly variables allow setting discretionary 
contemporaneous responses of fiscal variables to changes in underlying macroeconomic 
conditions to zero. Therefore, the coefficients αi,j’s in (2) only reflect the automatic responses 
of fiscal variables to the rest of the variables of the system, the first source of innovations 
aforementioned. 
The way fiscal variables are defined allows making further assumptions concerning 
the values of the αi,j’s. Specifically, the semi-elasticities of fiscal variables to interest rate 
innovations are set to zero given that interest payments on government debt are excluded 
from both definitions. 6F7 Moreover, the automatic responses of public expenditure to economic 
activity and the real exchange rate are also set to zero. 7F8 The case of the price elasticity 
is different because some share of purchases of goods and services is likely to respond 
to the price level. Thus, we set the price elasticity of government expenditure to -0.5. 8F9 
Output and price elasticities of net taxes, αt,y and αt,p, are estimated at 0.64 and 0.87, 
respectively, fully in line with those in De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008). These are 
obtained as weighted averages of the elasticities of the different net-tax components, 
including transfers, computed on the basis of information like statutory tax rates and 
estimations of the contemporaneous responses of the different tax-bases and, in the case 
of transfers, the relevant macroeconomic aggregate to GDP and price changes. 9F10 
Furthermore, given that our main interest lies on expenditure shocks we assume that 
spending decisions are prior to tax ones, which implies a zero value for βg,t. This allows us to 
retrieve gte  directly and use it to estimate βt,g by OLS, which completes the identification of the 
first two equations. For the remaining shocks the sequential ordering ytu , 
p
tu , 
r
tu and 
reer
tu  is 
imposed. The corresponding structural shocks are estimated by instrumental variables 
in turn, using gte  and 
t
te  as instruments for 
g
tu  and 
t
tu , respectively. In any case, since we 
are interested in studying the effects of fiscal policy shocks, the ordering for the remaining 
variables is immaterial to the results. 
In what follows we present our results in terms of impulse response functions. 
As usual, these are reported jointly with 68% confidence bands 10F11 obtained by Monte Carlo 
integration methods with 1000 replications. 
                                                                          
7. In many cases, the income tax base includes interest income as well as dividends, which in general co-vary negatively 
with interest rates. Nevertheless, the full set of effects of interest rate innovations on the different tax categories are 
very complex to analyse and, on the other hand, their contemporaneous effects are deemed to be very small. 
8. The absence of contemporaneous response to real exchange rate innovations can be justified on the grounds 
of the popular home bias of public expenditure items, especially public consumption. 
9. We took this assumption from Perotti (2004). De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) and Burriel et al. (2010) 
show that this assumption affects neither Spanish nor EMU results.  
10. Further details are provided in the appendix. 
11. Edelberg et al. (1999), Fatás and Mihov (2001), Blanchard and Perotti (2002) or Perotti (2004) among others, 
also choose this bandwidth to present their results. 
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4 3BThe effects of government spending shocks 
4.1  The baseline VAR 
Figure 1 displays the responses of the endogenous variables to a rise in public 
expenditure. 11F12 The shock is remarkably persistent and only phases out after three years. An 
increase in government expenditure entails a positive reaction of output for the first two 
years following the shock, which is largely in line with previous evidence for different 
countries. In general, government spending shocks are found to yield positive output 
responses in the short-term as shown by Blanchard and Perotti (2002), Perotti (2004), 
Fatás and Mihov (2001) or Mountford and Uhlig (2009) for the US, Heppke-Falk et al. 
(2006) for Germany, De Castro (2006) and De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) for 
Spain or Giordano et al. (2007) for Italy, although the size and persistence of output 
multipliers varies significantly across studies. 12F13 However, in the long term output falls due to 
the increase in interest rates. In turn, interest rates rise owing to higher inflation 13F14 and 
higher financing needs of the government. Net taxes also go up, partly aimed at providing 
funds for increased expenditure but mainly due to more buoyant economic activity 
stemming from the innovation. However, such initial rise in net taxes does not fully offset 
the increase in spending, leading to accumulate primary deficits. 
The real effective exchange rate vis-à-vis the rest of the World appreciates 
in response to higher government spending. 14F15 This pattern is consistent with not only 
the conventional Mundell-Fleming model and Keynesian analysis, but also with a wide set 
of RBC models under standard calibrations or with some New Keynesian formulations 
[see, for instance, Corsetti et al. (2009)]. Accordingly, higher public spending would entail 
an increase in nominal and real interest rates that would trigger capital inflows and the 
subsequent appreciation. Moreover, insofar as government spending mostly 
concentrates on home-produced goods, fiscal expansions should make these goods 
relatively scarcer, thereby increasing their relative price with respect to imported goods 
and leading to real appreciation. 
We also try an alternative specification that uses the real effective exchange 
rate vis-à-vis the euro area, instead of that with respect to the rest of the World. In this 
case, the responses of the different variables barely changed, although the real 
appreciation is fairly more persistent than in the baseline case (see Figure 2). This 
result is probably due to the higher degree of persistence of inflationary shocks in 
Spain than in the euro area. 15F16 It is worth noticing that, especially in this case, after EMU 
                                                                          
12. Impulse responses show deviations with respect to the baseline to a one-percent shock of the relevant fiscal 
variable. Hence, GDP responses cannot be directly interpreted as output multipliers. 
13. Caldara and Kamps (2008) show that, after controlling for differences in the specification of the reduced form model, 
all identification approaches used in the literature yield qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results for government 
spending shocks. Differences are, however, more marked in the case of tax shocks. 
14. We also estimated our baseline VAR until 2009. In this case prices did not react to spending shocks, although the 
responses of the other variables were broadly the same. This is due to the special circumstances that affected 
the Spanish economy that year. Specifically, a sizeable fiscal stimulus package was implemented in 2009 concomitant 
with the negative inflation due to the fall of bank credit. 
15. Bénétrix and Lane (2009a and 2009b) obtain similar results for Ireland and for a panel of the EMU countries, 
respectively. 
16. There are a number of elements behind this feature. Specifically, the European Commission and the ECB have 
repeatedly claimed that indexation clauses in collective bargaining have a pervasive effect on inflation persistence 
in Spain. 
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Figure 1: Responses to an increase in government spending: Baseline VAR
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accession, real exchange movements with respect to the rest of the euro area stem 
exclusively from inflation differentials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, our results in this regard oppose to Kim and Roubini (2008) for the US for 
the period 1973-2002, Monacelli and Perotti (2010) for Australia, the U.S. and the U.K. 
or Ravn et al. (2007) for a pool of Australia, Canada, the U.S. and the U.K., where higher 
government expenditure yields real depreciations. 
It could be argued that including the GDP deflator as an endogenous variable in 
our VAR would imply some degree of double counting of relative prices as they enter in the 
definition of the real effective exchange rate as well, although the latter are calculated with 
consumer prices. Hence, we estimated our VAR without the GDP deflator to test to what 
extent our results might be affected. Figure 3 shows that impulse responses of the rest 
of the endogenous variables do not differ significantly from Figure 1. Only some difference in 
terms of significance of the response of net taxes after the 13th quarter after the shock 
is perceived. Accordingly, the hypothetical double counting of relative prices does not seem 
to affect the results. 
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Figure 3: Responses to an increase in government spending: VAR without prices
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Figure 2: Responses to an increase in government spending: REER vis-à-vis the
euro area
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4.2 8BThe effects on relative prices and the nominal effective exchange rate 
Real appreciation driven by spending shocks can be due to nominal appreciation, increase 
in relative home prices or both. In our case, since Spain is a small economy, it seems highly 
unlikely that domestic spending shocks lead to significant effects on the level of foreign 
prices. Hence, relative price responses to domestic fiscal shocks should mainly arise from 
the reaction of domestic prices. Figure 4 compares nominal and real effective exchange 
rates for Spain and the euro area. Until 1993, the REER of Spain presents sizeable 
movements that to a large extent seem to be explained by the NEER. As of 1993 though, 
the NEER displays a more stable behaviour. However, after 1999 some decupling between 
both indexes seems to show up reflecting the adoption of the euro. In this period, the 
NEER shows an appreciation trend, although of considerable lower intensity than in the 
euro area as a whole, which reflects the evolution of some idiosyncratic factors in the NEER 
in spite of having a fixed nominal exchange rate with the rest of the euro area countries. In 
any case, it is true that after the adoption of the common currency, real exchange 
movements take mainly the form of inflation differentials with respect to the rest of the euro 
area, which cannot be properly interpreted without considering the long-run real exchange 
drivers [Galstyan and Lane (2009b)]. 
 
Figure 4: Nominal and real effective exchange rate indexes in Spain and the euro 
area 
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In order to deepen the understanding of responses of the real effective exchange 
rate we substituted in our VAR the REER by the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER). 
Moreover, in order to account for the effect of relative prices, given that the real exchange 
rate is calculated with consumer prices, we substituted the GDP deflator by the CPI 
index so as to avoid an explicit double counting of price effects. The identification strategy 
was similar to the baseline VAR. Figure 5 shows that higher public spending leads to 
nominal appreciation as indicated by the upward and persistent response of NEER, 
which in fact turns out to be similar to the response of the real exchange rate displayed 
in Figure 1. Such nominal appreciation is consistent with the increase in nominal interest 
rates following the shock. On the other hand, domestic consumer prices also rise persistently. 
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As external prices can be assumed not to react to domestic fiscal shocks, such increase 
in consumer prices reflects further competitiveness losses due to higher relative home 
prices.Therefore, real appreciation in response to fiscal shocks stems from both nominal 
appreciation and higher relative prices.16F17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As explained above, the adoption of the euro entails a fixed exchange rate vis à vis 
the rest of the EMU countries. Given that most of Spain’s trade takes place with EMU 
countries it could be expected an almost negligible response of NEER 17F18 to government 
spending shocks as of 1999 18F19 as NEER movements are largely determined by factors 
affecting the euro area as a whole, 19F20 which to some extent could be deemed as exogenous 
as far as Spain is concerned. In view of the insufficient number of observations to estimate 
our VAR with an acceptable degree of accuracy since euro accession, we carried out two 
alternative exercises. Firstly, we restricted or sample until 1998; Figure 6 shows the 
corresponding impulse responses. Leaving aside the fact that the long-term fall of GDP 
is now non-significant, the rest of the variables present similar responses to those obtained 
                                                                          
17. The VAR was also estimated with the GDP deflator, the NEER and relative prices. Expenditure shocks also led to the 
appreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate and to higher relative prices in the short term, although this latter 
effect turned out to be much lower, possibly due to the explicit double counting of prices. 
18. Recall that the NEER is calculated with respect to the rest of the world. 
19. The same model was estimated with a dummy with ones from 1999Q1 onwards. This dummy turned out to be 
significant only in the NEER equation. Nevertheless, the inclusion of such dummy did not alter the results at all. 
20. However, as Figure 4 shows there are still significant idiosyncratic factors behind NEER movements. 
Figure 5: Responses of nominal effective exchange rate and consumer prices to an
increase in government spending
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with the whole sample: spending shocks bring about both nominal effective exchange rate 
appreciation and higher relative prices. 
Secondly, we estimated a 5-variable VAR where the NEER entered as an exogenous 
variable. Arguably, this model might better fit the current setting and accordingly be 
somewhat more accurate to assess the effects on relative prices. Nevertheless, as Figure 7 
shows, the reaction of endogenous variables, including consumer (and accordingly relative 
since foreign prices are assumed not to respond to Spanish shocks) prices did not 
differ significantly from previous specifications.20F21 Specifically for the purpose of this paper, 
spending shocks lead to real appreciation due to higher relative domestic prices. Interestingly, 
our results indicate that the adoption of the common currency has not implied a change 
in the way fiscal shocks affect relative prices and undermine external competitiveness.21F22 
 
 
                                                                          
21. In fact, the NEER only turned out to be significant in the government spending equation. 
22. Especially since 1999, the 3-year Spanish interest rate can be viewed in terms of a benchmark rate plus a spread. 
Accordingly, we re-specified the model including the interest rate of German bonds as an exogenous variable and the 
spread as the endogenous one in lieu of the 3-year rate. As expected, results did not change. 
Figure 6: Responses to an increase in government spending for the period 1980-1998
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Figure 7: Responses to an increase in government spending with exogenous nominal 
effective exchange rate
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4.3 9BEffects on net exports 
To assess the effect of spending innovations on the external sector of the economy we enlarged 
our baseline model in two different ways: firstly, we specified a 7-variable VAR model including net 
exports; secondly, we estimated an 8-variable VAR where in addition to the variables in the 
baseline model, we included exports and imports of goods and services. Both specifications are 
formally equivalent, although the latter allows us to better understand the driving forces behind the 
reaction of net foreign demand. The corresponding impulse responses are presented in Figure 8. 
Higher government spending deteriorates the balance of goods and services for 
around two and a half years due to the real appreciation. On the one hand, the home-bias 
of government expenditure explains the initial lack of response of imports. On the other hand, 
real appreciation discourages the external demand of domestic production and consequently 
exports decline for around 10 quarters, becoming their response non-significant thereafter. 
Given the relatively high import content of Spanish exports, their decline contributes to 
reducing the demand of foreign-produced goods as of the second year after the shock. 
Nevertheless, such decline offsets only partially the negative response of exports. 
As pointed out in section 4.1 and shown in the last chart in the first column of 
Figure 8, spending shocks also lead to run up primary deficits. Therefore, our results are 
fully consistent with the “twin deficits” hypothesis. It could be argued that Spain enjoyed 
a protracted period of fiscal consolidation since the mid-nineties (with the exception of 2008) 
nonetheless characterised by a sharp deterioration of the external balance of goods and 
services, which seems to contradict the “twin deficits” hypothesis. However, only in the first 
years of this period can an expenditure-based fiscal consolidation be considered to have 
taken place. In fact, Figure 9 compares the evolution of our government expenditure variable 
and net exports, both as percentages of GDP, and shows a remarkably dynamic behaviour of 
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government spending since 2000. Therefore, the significant improvement of government 
balances since then is entirely due to sizeable revenue windfalls to a large extent linked to 
the housing boom [see Morris et al. (2009)], rather than to expenditure retrenchment. 
Interestingly, Figure 9 shows a negative correlation between government expenditure variable 
and net exports, which supports our assessment about the “twin deficits” hypothesis. 
Moreover, our conclusions so far are also in accordance with Corsetti and Müller (2006), 
notably small and more open countries are more likely to register twin deficits, especially 
when fiscal shocks are very persistent, which is also the case here. 
Figure 8: Effects of government spending on net exports 
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Figure 9: Government expenditure and net exports (% GDP) 
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4.4 10BVariance decompositions 
Variance decompositions in Figure 10 show the percentage of the forecast error of the 
nominal and real effective exchange rates, consumer prices as a proxy for relative prices and 
the net exports. In the quarters immediately after the shock the largest share of the variance 
of the forecast error of the REER is mainly explained by prices and by its own shocks, while 
GDP, interest rates and government spending only accounted for less than 10% of the whole 
variance each. The peak contribution of government spending is reached in the fifth quarter, 
with some 10%, whereas the interest rate takes around 20 quarters to get to this level. 
However, from the second year onwards most of the forecast error variance of the REER is 
explained by the GDP (around 80%), whereas the share explained by prices decline to some 
10% after 5 years, close to the contribution of the interest rate. 
The case of the NEER is similar, with the contribution of government spending 
peaking in the fifth quarter at some 13%, while that of GDP increasing steadily to slightly 
below 90%. The share explained by the interest rate presents a similar pattern to the case of 
the REER. In turn, the forecast error variance of consumer prices in the quarters following the 
shock is mainly attributed to their own and to GDP innovations, with the latter accounting 
for between 10% and 20% of the total variance. Nevertheless, as of the third year the 
contribution of GDP shocks increases sharply to account for the biggest proportion. Contrary 
to previous cases though, the share attributed to government spending shocks increases 
gradually to amount to 7.2% in the 16th quarter. 
Regarding net exports, conclusions are very alike. While in the first quarters most 
of the variance of its forecast error is explained by own developments, GDP and prices 
become the main explanatory variables in the medium to long term. 
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Figure 10: Variance decompositions 
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4.5 11BThe effects of different expenditure components 
In general, the different government expenditure items are expected to entail 
non-homogeneous effects on other economic variables. In particular, Baxter and King (1993) 
argue that an increase in government investment has a stronger impact on output than 
an increase in government consumption, while Alesina et al. (2002) argue that public wage 
increases may exert upward pressure on the equilibrium wage of the economy that would 
lead to lower profits and investment. However, evidence on the impact on external 
competitiveness is scarcer: Ricci et al. (2008) and Lee et al. (2008) highlight the empirical 
role of government consumption as an important driver of medium-term real exchange rate 
movements for a large panel of countries; moreover, Froot and Rogoff (1991), De Gregorio 
et al. (1994) and Galstyan and Lane (2009b) found that increases in government consumption 
lead to long-run real appreciation.22F23 
On the other hand, government consumption and government investment may be 
expected to have different effects on relative prices. It is usually assumed that an increase 
in government consumption triggers the relative demand for non-tradables and thereby 
causes real appreciation. By contrast, a long-run increase in public investment is deemed 
to have an ambiguous impact on the real exchange rate because an expansion in the stock 
of public capital may be expected to enhance productivity. In this connection, an increase in 
public investment that enhances productivity in the tradables sector may generate real 
appreciation through the Balassa-Samuelson mechanism, whereas if such productivity 
gains take place fundamentally in non-tradables sector, it may actually lead to real 
depreciation. In this regard, Galstyan and Lane (2009b) show that as government investment 
is usually associated with a decline in the relative price of non-tradables, it has no significant 
long-term impact on the real exchange rate for the EMU countries. 
 
                                                                          
23. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2002), Galstyan and Lane (2009a) and Bénétrix and Lane (2009a) provide some similar 
evidence for Ireland. 
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To assess their effects, we replaced government expenditure by purchases of 
goods and services, personnel expenditure and public investment in turn in our baseline VAR. 
Figure 11 shows the responses of REER to shocks to these different government 
components. As expected, an increase in purchases of goods and services entails a real 
appreciation as a result of higher relative demand for non-tradables. However, a rise in 
personnel expenditure provokes a positive, though non-significant response of the REER 
in the very short term that after some quarters becomes negative and significant. Such real 
depreciation may be linked to the fall in private investment profitability [Alesina et al. (2002)], 
and the subsequent productivity losses, led by the upward pressure on private wages exerted 
by public wages. Finally, a shock to public investment generates a real appreciation, which 
seems to suggest that productivity gains derived from higher public investment materialise 
more intensively in the tradables sector, in line the Balassa-Samuelson argument. 
 
Figure 11: Effects of expenditure components on the exchange rate 
 
 
4.6 12BOutput multipliers 
While cumulative output multipliers23F24 on impact are estimated at slightly below 0.5, they rise 
to around one or even higher one year after the shock (see Table 1) in the different models we 
estimate. In fact, in view of their standard errors, output multipliers are not statistically different 
across the different specifications. For instance, although multipliers gauged with the VAR 
without the GDP deflator looked slightly smaller they were within the one-standard deviation 
confidence interval of those obtained with the baseline VAR. These values are broadly in line 
with multipliers gauged in De Castro (2006) or De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) 
in the case of Spain, Giordano et al. (2007) for Italy and Heppke-Falk et al. (2006) for 
                                                                          
24. The cumulative multiplier at a given quarter is obtained as the ratio of the cumulative response of GDP and the 
cumulative response of government expenditure at that quarter. 
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Germany. By contrast, these turn out to be somewhat higher than VAR-based output 
multipliers for the US. [Fatás and Mihov (2001); Perotti (2004); Mountford and Uhlig (2009), 
and Burriel et al. (2010)] or for the EMU as a whole [Burriel et al. (2010)]. 
However, the effects of fiscal policy depend, inter alia, on the exchange rate regime, 
the degree of economic openness and the monetary policy regime. In particular, the effects of 
fiscal policy shocks on output are deemed to be larger under fixed exchange rates and with 
accommodative monetary policy. Conversely, fiscal multipliers are expected to decrease 
with the degree of openness. In this connection, Spain has undergone significant changes in 
these areas over the period covered by our sample. Firstly, Spain joined the EU in 1986, 
which meant an unprecedented opening to international trading flows. Secondly, both floating 
and fixed exchange rates have prevailed since 1980. Specifically, Spain joined the European 
Monetary System (EMS) mechanism in 1989, which set a quasi-fixed exchange rate regime 
with respect to the Deutsche Mark, and later on joined the EMU.24F25 Therefore, a (quasi) fixed 
exchange rate regime has prevailed in Spain since 1989. Finally, the Law of Autonomy of the 
Bank of Spain was approved in 1993, according to which monetisation of public deficits 
were forbidden thereafter. 
These factors, especially the exchange rate regime, may presumably have affected 
fiscal multipliers. In order to assess its importance we re-estimated our baseline VAR for the 
period 1989-2009 characterised by a (quasi) fixed exchange rate regime. While in this case 
our output multiplier on impact stood at 0.5, it rose to 1.4 four quarters after the shock, 
which turned out to be statistically higher than with the whole sample. By contrast, when we 
restricted the sample period until 1998, i.e. skipping the fixed exchange rate period strictly 
speaking, output multipliers turned out to be significantly lower, falling below 0.7 four quarters 
after the shock and becoming non-significant thereafter. Therefore, our estimates for Spain 
are consistent with the hypothesis of fiscal policy being more effective under fixed than under 
flexible exchange rates. 
By spending component, all items bring about positive output multipliers on impact 
around 0.4. However, differences show up in medium term responses. Specifically, public 
investment involves a stronger impact on output than government consumption and total 
government spending as a whole in the medium term. This evidence is consistent with Baxter 
and King (1993) and suggests the presence of spillovers between public investment and 
private sector productivity. Moreover, public spending on goods and services yields similar 
or even higher output multipliers than public investment. This can be explained by the fact 
that significant share of public investment, i.e. machinery equipment, materializes in imported 
goods and, accordingly, does not affect home multipliers. In addition, not all public 
investment projects can be deemed as “productive”, for which the usual argument about the 
positive spillovers on private sector productivity does not hold in all cases. Conversely, 
personnel expenditure, despite yielding positive and significant output multipliers on impact, 
they quickly become negative and significant during the second year after the shock. 
Therefore, these negative output effects derived from the government’s wage bill explain the 
                                                                          
25. Despite the quasi-fixed exchange rate regime, constant depreciations within the bands set by EMS along with four 
devaluations took place between 1992 and 1995 as a consequence of the turmoil in the EMS after the rejection 
of the Maastricht Treaty by Denmark. 
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also negative multipliers of total public consumption in the medium term in that personnel 
expenditure is the largest item of public consumption.25F26 
 
Table 1: Cumulative output multipliers in different specifications 
Notes: Cumulative output multipliers at a given quarter are defined as the cumulative output response 
relative to the cumulative increase in the relevant expenditure item. An asterisk indicates that the 
estimated value is significant within a 68% confidence interval. 
 
                                                                          
26. Regarding the effects stemming from different spending items, De Castro and Hernández de Cos (2008) obtain 
similar results. 
q=1 q=4 q=8 q=12
Baseline VAR 0.41* 0.94* 0.95* 0.55
Baseline VAR without GDP deflator 0.37* 0.84* 0.91* 0.69*
VAR with neert and CPI 0.42* 0.89* 0.93* 0.57
VAR with CPI and exogenous neert 0.44* 1.07* 1.45* 1.2*
VAR with net exports 0.43* 1.003* 1.04* 0.73*
Baseline VAR since 1989 0.49* 1.36* 1.98* 1.78
Baseline VAR 1980-1998 0.34* 0.66* -0.52 -1.3
Expenditure on goods and services 0.39* 1.56* 2.36* 2.21*
Personnel expenditure 0.42* -0.64 -4.59* -14.09
Total public consumption 0.28* 0.23 -1.03* -3.08*
Public investment 0.4* 1.03* 1.89* 1.75
Quartes after the shock
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 27 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO Nº 1121 
5 4BConclusions 
The empirical literature on the effects of public spending on the exchange rate and the current 
account is especially inconclusive. Most of this strand of the literature focuses on the US 
economy, while evidence about other countries is scanter. This paper contributes a new 
piece of evidence for the Spanish case. In order to assess the effects of public expenditure 
on variables characterising the external side of the economy we estimate a SVAR following 
the methodology sketched in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
Our analysis shows that government spending brings about positive output 
responses, jointly with real appreciation. Such real appreciation is explained by persistent 
nominal appreciation and higher relative prices, although after EMU accession real 
exchange rate movements are to a large extent the result of inflation differentials. Moreover, 
our results indicate that the adoption of the common currency has not implied any 
significant change in the way fiscal shocks affect external competitiveness through their 
effect on relative prices. In turn, the current account deteriorates when government 
spending rises mainly due to the fall of exports caused by the real appreciation. 
Accordingly, our results in this regard are largely consistent not only with the conventional 
Mundell-Fleming model and, in general a traditional Keynesian view, but also with a wide 
set of RBC or New Keynesian models under standard calibrations. Moreover, our 
estimations are fully consistent with the “twin deficits” hypothesis. 
As for expenditure components, we observe that while spending on goods and 
services and public investment increase output and lead to real appreciation, higher 
personnel expenditure weights on economic activity and brings about real depreciation 
already in the second year after the shock. Such real depreciation might be linked to 
lower potential growth as a result of lower investment profitability stemming from 
higher labour costs. 
On the other hand, we obtain output multipliers around 0.5 on impact and slightly 
above unity one year after the shock. These multipliers are in line with previous empirical 
evidence regarding some individual European countries, such as Germany, Italy or even 
Spain, although they seem to be on the high side when compared with multipliers estimated 
for other OECD countries, including the US. Finally, we find some evidence in favour of the 
hypothesis of output multipliers being higher under fixed exchange rates in the case of Spain. 
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5BAppendix: Construction of output and price elasticities 
In order to calculate the output and price elasticities we basically follow the OECD 
methodology proposed in Giorno et al. (1995), which focuses on four tax categories, i.e. 
personal income tax, corporate income tax, indirect taxes and social security contributions. 
In addition, they consider the elasticity of transfer programmes, notably unemployment 
benefits. According to this methodology, the output elasticity of the personal income tax 
can be obtained as: 
 
yempempwwtdirhytdirh ,,,, )1( εεεε +=  (A.1) 
 
where wtdirh,ε  is the elasticity of personal income tax revenues to earnings, measured by 
the compensation per employee, empw,ε  is the employment elasticity of the real wage 
and yemp,ε  the GDP elasticity of employment. Analogously, the output elasticity of social 
security contributions is: 
 
yempempwwssyss ,,,, )1( εεεε +=  (A.2) 
 
with wss,ε  being the elasticity of social contributions to earnings. 
The output elasticity of corporate income tax revenues stems from: 
 
ygosgostdircytdirc ,,, εεε =  (A.3) 
 
where gostdirc,ε  is the elasticity of tax revenues to the gross operating surplus and ygos,ε  
the output elasticity of the gross operating surplus. In the same fashion, given that the 
main tax base for indirect tax collections is private consumption, the output elasticity of 
indirect taxes is obtained as: 
 
ycctindytind ,,, εεε =  (A.4) 
 
where ctind ,ε  and yc,ε  are the private consumption elasticity of indirect taxes and the output 
elasticity of private consumption, respectively. 
Since we employ data on a national accounts basis, collection lags should not affect 
the elasticities to the respective tax-bases significantly. Hence, these have been taken from 
van den Noord (2000) and Bouthevillain et al. (2001). The output elasticities of the relevant tax 
bases were, however, obtained from econometric estimation on a quarterly basis. In general, 
the general equation used for estimating these elasticities was: 
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where Bi is the relevant tax base for the ith tax category and εi is the output elasticity of 
such tax base. These equations, given the likely contemporaneous correlation between 
the independent variable and the error term, were estimated by instrumental variables. 
However, if the variables Bi and Y are cointegrated, (A.5) contains a specification error. In this 
case, the following ECM specification would be preferable: 
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where λ measures the long-term contemporaneous elasticity we are interested in. 
Information on the output elasticity of net transfers is more limited than in the 
former cases. Although unemployment benefits respond to the underlying economic 
conditions, many expenditure programmes do not have built-in conditions that make 
them respond contemporaneously to employment or output. Therefore, recalling Perotti’s 
argument, an output elasticity of net transfers of -0.2 has been assumed. 
As for price elasticities, following van der Noord (2000) those of direct taxes 
paid by households, corporate income taxes and social contributions were obtained as 
1,, −= wtdirhptdirh εε , 1,, −= gostdircptdirc εε  and 1,, −= wsspss εε , respectively. Indirect taxes are 
typically proportional. Hence, following Perotti (2004), a zero price elasticity was assumed. 
Finally, although transfer programmes are indexed to the CPI, indexation occurs with a 
considerable lag. Thus, the price elasticity of transfers was set to -1. 
Accordingly, contemporaneous output elasticities of net taxes can be calculated as: 
 
T
Ti
yiB
i
iBiTyt ,,, εεα =  (A.7) 
 
with = iTT  being the level of net taxes26F27, iBiT ,ε  the elasticity of the ith category of net taxes 
to its own tax base and yiB ,ε  the GDP elasticity of the tax base of the i
th category of net 
taxes. Price elasticities are obtained in a similar fashion. Table 2 shows the resulting output 
and price elasticities. 
 
 
                                                                          
27. The Ti’s are positive in the case of taxes and negative in the case of transfers. 
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 Table 2: Output and price elasticities of net taxes  
  Output elasticities Price elasticities 
εtdirh,w   1.8 εtdirh,y  0.17 εtdir,p  0.8 
εw,emp  0.0 εss,y  0.17 εss,p -0.2 
εemp,y  0.17 εtdirc,y  1.04 εtind,p 0.0 
εss,w  0.8 εtind,y  0.3 εtransf,p -1.0 
εtdirc,gos  1.0 εtransf,y -0.2 εt,p 0.87 
εgos,y  1.04 εt,y  0.62   εc,y   0.3     
εtind,c  1.0     
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